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Abstract
The infinitary propositional logic of here-and-there is important for the theory of answer set programming
in view of its relation to strongly equivalent transformations of logic programs. We know a formal system
axiomatizing this logic exists, but a proof in that system may include infinitely many formulas. In this note
we describe a relationship between the validity of infinitary formulas in the logic of here-and-there and the
provability of formulas in some finite deductive systems. This relationship allows us to use finite proofs to
justify the validity of infinitary formulas. This note is under consideration for publication in Theory and
Practice of Logic Programming.
1 Introduction
The semantics of ASP programs can be defined using a translation that turns programs into sets
of infinitary propositional formulas (Gebser et al. 2015). To prove properties of ASP programs
we need then to reason about stable models of infinitary formulas in the sense of Truszczynski
(2012). In particular, we often need to know which transformations of infinitary formulas do
not affect their stable models. It is useful to know, for instance, that stable models of infinitary
formulas are not affected by applying the infinitary De Morgan’s laws∧
α∈A
¬Fα ↔¬
∨
α∈A
Fα , (1)
and ∨
α∈A
¬Fα ↔¬
∧
α∈A
Fα (2)
where A may be infinite. “Strongly equivalent” transformations of this kind are used in the proof
of the interchangeability of the cardinality constraint {p(X)}0 and the conditional literal⊥ : p(X)
(Harrison et al. 2015a, Example 7), as well as the proof of correctness of the n-queens program
given in the electronic appendix of (Gebser et al. 2015).
Strongly equivalent transformations of infinitary formulas are characterized by the infinitary
logic of here-and-there (Harrison et al. 2015). The set of theorems in the sense of that paper co-
incides with the set of all infinitary formulas that are “HT-valid”—satisfied by all interpretations
in the sense of the logic of here-and-there.
The set of theorems is defined by Harrison et al. (2015) in terms of closure under a set of infer-
ence rules; there is no definition of a proof in that paper. It is possible to reformulate the definition
of a theorem in terms of proofs, but those proofs would consist generally of infinitely many for-
mulas, because some of the inference rules introduced there have infinitely many premises. In
formalized mathematics, proofs are useful in that they are finite syntactic objects that can estab-
lish the validity of assertions about infinite domains. “Infinite proofs”, on the other hand, do not
have this property.
Can we use finite syntactic objects of some kind to establish that an infinitary formula is HT-
valid, at least in some cases?
The definition of an instance of a propositional formula (Harrison et al. 2015a) may help us
answer this question. Propositions 1 and 3 in that paper show that substituting infinitary formu-
las for atoms in a finite intuitionistically provable formula results in an HT-valid formula. For
example, the formula
(p∨q)∧ r ↔ (p∧ r)∨ (q∧ r) (3)
is intuitionistically provable;1 it follows that for any infinitary formulas F , G, H, the infinitary
formula
(F ∨G)∧H ↔ (F ∧H)∨ (G∧H) (4)
is HT-valid. We can think of a proof of (3) as a proof of (4) with respect to the substitution that
maps p to F , q to G, and r to H. In a similar way, we can talk about proofs of the formula(∨
α∈A
Fα
)
∧G ↔
∨
α∈A
(Fα ∧G) (5)
for any non-empty finite family (Fα)α∈A of infinitary formulas and any infinitary formula G.
In this paper we show how the idea of an infinitary instance of a finite formula can be used in
a different setting. We will define instances for first-order formulas, and that will allow us, for
example, to talk about finite proofs of (5) even when A is infinite. Consider the signature that
has (symbols for) the elements of A as object constants, the unary predicate constant P, and the
propositional constant Q. We will see that (5) is the instance of the first-order formula
∃xP(x)∧Q ↔∃x(P(x)∧Q) (6)
corresponding to the substitution that maps P(α) to Fα , and Q to G. This formula is intuitionis-
tically provable, and according to the main theorem of this paper it follows that (5) is HT-valid.
After a review of the infinitary logic of here-and-there in Section 2, we define instances of a
first-order formula in Section 3, and state the main theorem in Section 4. Two other useful forms
of the main theorem are discussed in Section 6. The proof of the theorem is outlined in Section 7.
A preliminary report on this project was presented at the 8th Workshop on Answer Set Pro-
gramming and Other Computing Paradigms held in Cork, Ireland in 2015.
2 Infinitary Logic of Here-and-There
This review follows Harrison et al. (2015, 2015a).
1 Formalizations of propositional intuitionistic logic can be found, for instance, in Chapters 2 and 8 of Mints’s mono-
graph (2000). Formalizations of first-order intuitionistic logic can be found in Chapters 13 and 15 of that book.
2.1 Infinitary Formulas
Throughout this note, we will use σ to denote a propositional signature, that is, a set of propo-
sitional atoms. For every nonnegative integer r, (infinitary propositional) formulas (over σ ) of
rank r are defined recursively, as follows:
• every atom from σ is a formula of rank 0;
• if H is a set of formulas, and r is the smallest nonnegative integer that is greater than the
ranks of all elements of H , then H ∧ and H ∨ are formulas of rank r;
• if F and G are formulas, and r is the smallest nonnegative integer that is greater than the
ranks of F and G, then F → G is a formula of rank r.
We will write {F,G}∧ as F ∧G, and {F,G}∨ as F ∨G. The symbols⊤ and ⊥ will be understood
as abbreviations for /0∧ and for /0∨ respectively; ¬F and F ↔ G are understood as abbreviations
in the usual way.
A set or family of formulas is bounded if the ranks of its members are bounded from above.
For any bounded family (Fα)α∈A of formulas, we denote the formula {Fα : α ∈ A}∧ by
∧
α∈A Fα ,
and similarly for disjunctions. For example, if all formulas Fα and G are atoms then the left-hand
side of equivalence (5) is shorthand for the formula{
{Fα : α ∈ A}∨ ,G
}∧
of rank 2.
2.2 HT-Interpretations
An HT-interpretation of σ is an ordered pair 〈Ih, It〉 of subsets of σ such that Ih ⊆ It . The sym-
bols h, t are called worlds; respectively here and there. They are ordered by the relation h < t.
HT-interpretations are the special case of Kripke models for intuitionistic logic2 with only two
worlds.
The satisfaction relation between an HT-interpretation I = 〈Ih, It〉, a world w, and a formula is
defined recursively, as follows:
• I,w |= p if p ∈ Iw;
• I,w |= H ∧ if for every formula F in H , I,w |= F ;
• I,w |= H ∨ if there is a formula F in H such that I,w |= F ;
• I,w |= F → G if, for every world w′ such that w ≤ w′, I,w′ 6|= F or I,w′ |= G.
In particular,
I,w |= ¬F if, for every world w′ such that w≤ w′, I,w′ 6|= F .
We say that I satisfies F , and write I |= F , if I,h |= F (equivalently, if I,w |= F for every
world w). A formula is HT-valid if it is satisfied by all HT-interpretations.
2 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intuitionistic/#KriSemForIntLog
3 Substitutions and Instances
By Σ we denote an arbitrary signature in the sense of first-order logic that contains at least
one object constant. The signature may include propositional constants (viewed as predicate
constants of arity 0). Object constants will be viewed as function constants of arity 0. In first-
order formulas over Σ, we treat the binary connectives∧, ∨, and → and the 0-place connective⊥
as primitive;⊤, ¬, and ↔ are the usual abbreviations from propositional logic.
A substitution is a function ψ that maps each closed atomic formula over Σ to an infinitary
formula over σ , such that the range of ψ is bounded. A substitution ψ is extended from closed
atomic formulas to arbitrary closed first-order formulas over Σ as follows:
• ψ⊥ is ⊥;
• ψ(α1 = α2), where α1,α2 are ground terms, is ⊤ if α1 is α2, and ⊥ otherwise;
• ψ(F ⊙G), where ⊙ is a binary connective, is ψF ⊙ψG;
• ψ∀vF is ∧α ψFvα , where α ranges over the ground terms of Σ;3
• ψ∃vF is ∨α ψFvα , where α ranges over the ground terms of Σ.
The formula ψF will be called the instance of F with respect to ψ .
For example, if Σ includes the elements of A as object constants, but no other function con-
stants, then (5) is the instance of (6) with respect to the substitution ψ defined as follows:
ψP(α) = Fα ,
ψQ = G.
If the function constants of Σ are the object constant a and the unary function constant s, then
any infinite conjunction of the form ∧
i≥0
(Fi →Gi),
where Fi,Gi are infinitary formulas, is the instance of the first-order formula
∀x(P(x)→ Q(x))
with respect to the substitution ψ defined as follows:
ψ(P(si(a))) = Fi,
ψ(Q(si(a))) = Gi.
4 Main Theorem
The main theorem stated below shows that if a closed first-order formula is intuitionistically
provable then all its instances are HT-valid. The theorem is actually more general because it
refers to a deductive system that includes, in addition to the axioms and inference rules of first-
order intuitionistic logic with equality, some additional axioms. We can add, first of all, the axiom
schema
F ∨ (F → G)∨¬G (7)
(Hosoi 1966; Umezawa 1959), the axiom schema
∃x(F →∀xF) (8)
3 By Fvα we denote the result of substituting α for all free occurrences of v in F .
(Lifschitz et al. 2007), and the “decidable equality” axiom
x = y∨ x 6= y. (9)
We include also the axioms of the Clark Equality Theory (Clark 1978):
f (x1, . . . ,xn) 6= g(y1, . . . ,ym) (10)
for all pairs of distinct function constants f , g from Σ;
f (x1, . . . ,xn) = f (y1, . . . ,yn)→ (x1 = y1∧·· ·∧ xn = yn) (11)
for all function constants f from Σ of arity greater than 0; and
t(x) 6= x (12)
for all terms t(x) that contain x but are different from x.
The deductive system obtained from first-order intuitionistic logic with equality by adding
axioms (7)–(12) will be denoted by HHT (“Herbrand logic of here-and-there”).
Main Theorem. If a closed first-order formula F is provable in HHT then any instance of F is
HT-valid.
Example 1. The infinitary De Morgan’s laws (1) and (2) with non-empty A are HT-valid because
they are instances of the first-order formulas
∀x¬P(x)↔¬∃xP(x)
and
∃x¬P(x)↔¬∀xP(x)
respectively, and these formulas are provable in HHT. (The first equivalence, and one direction of
the second, are provable intuitionistically. To prove the second equivalence right-to-left, use (8)
with P(x) as F .)
If A is empty then formula (1) is ⊤ ↔ ¬⊥ and (2) is ⊥ ↔ ¬⊤. Both of these formulas are
HT-valid. However, in view of the restriction that Σ contain at least one object constant neither is
an instance of the formulas in the previous example. Without that restriction, the assertion of the
Main Theorem would become incorrect. Indeed, the formula ⊤→⊥ would be then an instance
of the intuitionistically provable formula ∀x P(x)→∃x P(x).
Example 2. As discussed above, the fact that formula (5) is HT-valid follows from the provability
of (6) in first-order intuitionistic logic. Consider the formula dual to (5):(∧
α∈A
Fα
)
∨G ↔
∧
α∈A
(Fα ∨G).
(As before, (Fα)α∈A is a non-empty family of infinitary formulas, and G is an infinitary formula.)
The fact that this formula is HT-valid can be derived from the main theorem above in a similar
way, with the corresponding first-order formula
∀xP(x)∨Q ↔∀x(P(x)∨Q).
The proof of the right-to-left direction will use (8), again with P(x) as F .
Example 3. Any formula of the form((∨
α∈A
Fα
)
→ G
)
↔
∧
α∈A
(Fα →G)
with non-empty A (Harrison et al. 2015a, Example 2) is HT-valid because it is an instance of the
intuitionistically provable formula
(∃xP(x)→Q)↔∀x(P(x)→ Q).
Example 4. Any formula of the form
∨
α∈A
Fα → ∧
β∈A
Fβ
 ,
where A is non-empty, is HT-valid because it is an instance of the axiom schema (8).
5 Including Restrictors
Under the definition of an instance above, all infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions in an in-
stance of a formula have the same indexing set. In this section we give a more general definition
that overcomes this limitation.
We assume here that some unary predicate symbols of the signature Σ may be designated as
restrictors. The role of restrictors will be somewhat similar to the role of sorts in a many-sorted
signature. A generalized variable is defined as either a variable or an expression of the form
(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn) (13)
where x1, . . . ,xn (n ≥ 1) are distinct variables, and R1, . . . ,Rn are restrictors. Formulas with re-
strictors are defined recursively in the same way as first-order formulas over Σ except that a
quantifier may be followed by a generalized variable. For instance, if Σ includes the unary pred-
icate constants P and R, and the latter is a restrictor, then
∀xP(x)→∀(x :R)P(x) (14)
is a formula with restrictors.
Generalized variables (13) can be eliminated from a formula with restrictors by replacing
subformulas of the form
∀(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F
with
∀x1 . . .xn(R1(x1)∧·· ·∧Rn(xn)→ F),
and subformulas of the form
∃(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F
with
∃x1 . . .xn(R1(x1)∧·· ·∧Rn(xn)∧F).
To prove a formula with restrictors in a deductive system means to prove the first-order formula
obtained by this transformation. For instance, we can say that formula (14) is provable in the
intuitionistic predicate calculus because the formula
∀xP(x)→∀x(R(x)→ P(x))
is provable in that deductive system. Satisfaction of closed formulas with restrictors is defined in
a similar way.
In the presence of restrictors, a substitution is defined as a function ψ that maps each closed
atomic formula F over Σ to one of the formulas ⊤, ⊥, if F begins with a restrictor, and to an
infinitary formula over σ otherwise, such that the range of ψ is bounded. A substitution ψ is
extended to closed first-order formulas over Σ with restrictors in the same way as for first-order
formulas as in Section 3, with the additional clauses:
• ψ ∀(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F is ∧
α1,...,αn : ψR1(α1)=···=ψRn(αn)=⊤
ψFx1···xnα1···αn ,
• ψ ∃(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F is ∨
α1,...,αn : ψR1(α1)=···=ψRn(αn)=⊤
ψFx1···xnαi···αn .
Main Theorem for Formulas with Restrictors. If a closed first-order formula F with restrictors
is provable in HHT then any instance of F is HT-valid.
Example 5. Consider a formula of the form∧
α∈A
Fα →
∧
α∈B
Fα , (15)
where B is a proper subset of A. It is an instance of (14): take the elements of A to be the only
function constants of Σ, and define the substitution ψ by the conditions
ψR(α) =⊤ iff α ∈ B,
ψP(α) = Fα .
Since (14) is intuitionistically provable, (15) is HT-valid.
Example 6. Any formula of the form∨
α∈A
Fα ∧
∨
β∈B
Gβ ↔
∨
(α ,β )∈A×B
(Fα ∧Gβ ) (16)
is an instance of the formula
∃(x :R1)P(x)∧∃(y :R2)Q(y)↔∃(x :R1,y :R2)(P(x)∧Q(y)). (17)
Indeed, we can include the elements of A∪B among the object constants of σ and choose ψ so
that
ψR1(α) =⊤ iff α ∈ A,
ψR2(α) =⊤ iff α ∈ B,
ψP(α) = Fα for all α ∈ A,
ψQ(α) = Gα for all α ∈ B.
Since (17) is intuitionistically provable, (16) is HT-valid.
References to the new version of the main theorem can be replaced in some cases by references
to the more restricted version from Section 4 at the cost of using more complicated substitutions.
For instance, the claim that formula (15) is HT-valid, under the additional assumption that B is
non-empty, can be justified as follows. Take Σ to be the signature consisting of the elements of A
as object constants, the unary function constant f , and the unary predicate constant P. Choose an
element α0 of B. Then (15) is the instance of the formula
∀xP(x)→∀xP( f (x))
with respect to the substitution ψ defined by the condition: for all object constants α ,
ψP(α) = Fα ,
ψP( f i(α)) = Fα if i ≥ 1 and α ∈ B,
ψP( f i(α)) = Fα0 if i ≥ 1 and α 6∈ B.
6 Including Second-Order Axioms
We will define now an extension HHT2 of HHT where predicate and function variables of arbi-
trary arity are included in the language, as in Section 1.2.3 of the handbook chapter by Lifschitz
et al. (2008). The set of axioms and inference rules of HHT is extended by adding the usual
postulates for second-order quantifiers, the axiom schema of comprehension
∃p∀x1 . . .xn(p(x1, . . . ,xn)↔ F) (18)
(n ≥ 0), where the predicate variable p is not free in F , and the axiom of choice
∀x1 . . .xn∃xn+1 p(x1, . . . ,xn+1)→
∃ f∀x1 . . .xn(p(x1, . . . ,xn, f (x1, . . . ,xn)))
(19)
(n > 0). The main theorem can be extended as follows.
Main Theorem for HHT2. If a closed first-order formula F (possibly with restrictors) is prov-
able in HHT2 then any instance of F is HT-valid.
In the special case when the signature Σ contains finitely many function constants, by DCA
we denote the domain closure axiom:
∀p
(∧
C f (p) → ∀x p(x)
)
where the conjunction extends over all function constants f from Σ, and C f (p) (“set p is closed
under f ”) stands for the formula
∀x1 . . .xn(p(x1)∧·· ·∧ p(xn)→ p( f (x1, . . . ,xn)).
(In the presence of DCA, axioms (9) and (12) become redundant.) For instance, if Σ contains an
object constant a and unary function constant s and no other function constants, then DCA turns
into the second-order axiom of induction
∀p(p(a)∧∀x(p(x)→ p(s(x)))→∀x p(x)) , (20)
and HHT2+ DCA becomes an extension of second-order intuitionistic arithmetic.
In the following version of the main theorem, the signature Σ is assumed to contain finitely
many function constants.
Main Theorem for HHT2+ DCA. If a closed first-order formula F (possibly with restrictors)
is provable in HHT2+ DCA then any instance of F is HT-valid.
Note that both versions of the main theorem stated in this section refer to first-order formulas
provable using second-order axioms. The notion of a substitution is not defined here for second-
order formulas.
Example 7. Any equivalence of the form(
F0∧
∧
i≥0
(Fi → Fi+1)
)
↔
∧
i≥0
Fi
(Harrison et al. 2015a, Example 1) is HT-valid. Indeed, with the appropriate choice of the signa-
ture Σ, it is an instance of the formula
P(a)∧∀x(P(x)→ P(s(x)))↔∀xP(x).
This formula is provable in HHT2+ DCA. (The implication left-to-right is given by axiom (20).)
7 Proof of Main Theorem
The proof of the theorem makes use of “Herbrand HT-interpretations”—Kripke models with
two worlds and with the universe consisting of all ground terms of the signature Σ. We will see
that all theorems of HHT (and its extensions discussed in the previous section) are satisfied by
all Herbrand HT-interpretations. On the other hand, for any substitution ψ and any HT-interpre-
tation I of σ , we can find an Herbrand HT-interpretation J such that J satisfies a closed first-order
formula F if and only if I satisfies ψF . The main theorem will directly follow from these two
facts.
An Herbrand HT-interpretation of a first-order signature Σ is a pair 〈Jh,Jt〉 of subsets of the
Herbrand base of Σ (that is, the set of all ground atomic formulas over Σ that do not include
equality) such that Jh ⊆ Jt . By U we denote the Herbrand universe of Σ, that is, the set of all
ground terms over Σ.
For each function f of arity n > 0 that maps from U n to U we introduce a function constant
f∗ of arity n, called the function name of f. For each pair p= (ph,pt) of subsets of U n such that
ph ⊆ pt , we introduce an n-ary predicate constant p∗, called the predicate name of (ph,pt). By Σ∗
we denote the signature obtained by adding all function and predicate names to Σ, and by U ∗
we denote the Herbrand universe of Σ∗. Then for each term α ∈U ∗, we define the term α̂ ∈U
recursively as follows:
• if α is an object constant from U then α̂ is α;
• if α is of the form f (α1, . . . ,αn) where f is a function constant from Σ, then α̂ is f (α̂1, . . . , α̂n);
• if α is of the form f∗(α1, . . . ,αn) where f∗ is a function name, then α̂ is the element of U
obtained by applying f to 〈α̂1, . . . , α̂n〉.
The satisfaction relation between an Herbrand HT-interpretation J = 〈Jh,Jt〉, a world w, and a
closed second-order formula F over Σ is defined recursively, as follows:
(i) J,w 6|=⊥.
(ii) J,w |= α1 = α2 if α̂1 is α̂2.
(iii) J,w |= P(α1, . . . ,αn) if P(α̂1, . . . , α̂n) ∈ Jw.
(iv) J,w |= p∗(α1, . . . ,αn) if 〈α̂1, . . . , α̂n〉 ∈ pw.
(v) J,w |= F ∧G if J,w |= F and J,w |= G; similarly for ∨.
(vi) J,w |= F → G if for every world w′ such that w ≤ w′, J,w′ 6|= F or J,w′ |= G.
(vii) J,w |= ∀vF , where v is an object variable, if for each ground term α over Σ, J,w |= Fvα ;
similarly for ∃.
(viii) J,w |= ∀vF , where v is a function variable, if for each function name f∗ of the same arity as
v, J,w |= Fvf∗ ; similarly for ∃.
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(ix) J,w |= ∀vF , where v is a predicate variable, if for each predicate name p∗ of the same arity
as v, J,w |= Fvp∗ ; similarly for ∃.
A closed second-order formula F over Σ∗ is HHT-valid if J,h |= F for every Herbrand HT-
interpretation J.
Soundness Lemma.
(a) If a second-order formula F over Σ∗ is provable in HHT2 then the universal closure of F
is HHT-valid.
(b) For any first-order signature Σ containing finitely many function constants, if a second-
order formula F over Σ∗ is provable in HHT2+ DCA then the universal closure of F is
HHT-valid.
The lemma is proved by induction on the derivation of F .
Lifting Lemma. Let I be an HT-interpretation of a propositional signature σ , ψ be a substitution
from a first-order signature Σ (possibly containing restrictors) to σ , and J be the Herbrand HT-
interpretation defined by the condition: for every world w
J,w |= P(α1, . . . ,αn) iff I,w |= ψP(α1, . . .αn).
Then for any closed first-order formula F (possibly with restrictors)
J,w |= F iff I,w |= ψF.
The lemma is proved by strong induction on the total number of connectives and quantifiers
in F . If F is atomic, then the assertion of the lemma is immediate from the definition of J. Here
are two of the other cases.
Case ∀vF:
J,w |= ∀vF
iff for each ground term α , J,w |= Fvα
iff for each ground term α , I,w |= ψFvα
iff I,w |=
∧
α ψFvα
iff I,w |= ψ (∧α Fvα) .
Case ∀(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F : We need to show that
J,w |= ∀(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F
iff
I,w |=
∧
α1,...,αn: ψR1(α1)=···=ψRn(αn)=⊤
ψFx1,··· ,xnα1,··· ,αn . (21)
Indeed,
4 The notation for substituting a function name for a function variable is the same as that of substituting a term for an
object variable; similarly for predicate names and predicate variables.
J,w |= ∀(x1 :R1, . . . ,xn :Rn)F
iff J,w |= ∀x1, . . . ,xn(R1(x1)∧·· ·∧Rn(xn)→ F)
iff J,w′ |= Fx1,··· ,xnα1,··· ,αn in every world w′ ≥ w and for each tuple of ground terms α1, . . . ,αn such
that J,w′ |= R1(α1)∧·· ·∧Rn(αn)
iff I,w′ |= ψFx1,··· ,xnα1,··· ,αn in every world w′ ≥ w and for each tuple of ground terms α1, . . . ,αn
such that I,w′ |= ψR1(α1)∧·· ·∧ψRn(αn)
iff I,w′ |= ψFx1,··· ,xnα1,··· ,αn in every world w′ ≥ w and for each tuple of ground terms α1, . . . ,αn
such that ψR1(α1) = · · ·= ψRn(αn) =⊤
iff in every world w′ ≥ w,
I,w′ |=
∧
α1,...,αn: ψR1(α1)=···=ψRn(αn)=⊤ψF
x1,··· ,xn
α1,··· ,αn .
The condition above is equivalent to (21) by the monotonicity property of the satisfaction relation
in the logic of here-and-there.
The main theorem is immediate from the two lemmas stated above.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we defined when an infinitary propositional formula is an instance of a first-order
formula. The provability of first-order formulas in some extensions of intuitionistic logic implies
that all instances of these formulas are HT-valid. Theorems of this kind can be used for estab-
lishing the strong equivalence of logic programs that use local variables ranging over infinite
domains.5
If an infinite conjunction is an instance of a first-order formula then it is syntactically uniform,
in the sense that all its conjunctive terms are all of the same kind—either each of them is an atom,
or each is an implication, and so forth. The same can be said about infinite disjunctions. This fact
points to a limitation on the applicability of the method of proving HT-validity described in this
paper. For instance, formulas of the form
(¬¬F1∨¬F1)∧ (F2 → F2)∧ (¬¬F3∨¬F3)∧ (F4 → F4)∧·· · (22)
are HT-valid, but they are not instances of any first-order formula provable in the deductive
systems discussed above. Indeed, if (22) is an instance of a first-order formula F then F is either
an atom such that its predicate symbol is not a restrictor of F , or such an atom preceded by
a universally quantified generalized variable. Such first-order formulas are not provable. But it
is clear that (22) can be tranformed into an instance of a theorem of HHT by rewriting it as a
conjunction of two infinite conjunctions:
((¬¬F1∨¬F1)∧ (¬¬F3∨¬F3)∧·· ·)∧ ((F2 → F2)∧ (F4 → F4)∧·· ·).
In this sense, the syntactic uniformity of instances of first-order formulas is not a significant
limitation.
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